# 1NC

### 1

#### Reject the aff’s coercive politics

Younkins 2k (Dr. Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling Jesuit University in West Virginia, “Civil Society: The Realm of Freedom,” No 63, 6-10-2000, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000610-11.htm, JMP)

Recently (and ironically), government projects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state subsidization or coercive mandates. Such coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. Statists who support such projects believe only in the power of political society – they don't realize that the subsidized or mandated activity can be performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don't understand that to propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity, but simply its coercion.

If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary cooperation for coercion and replace mandates with the rule of law. According to the Cato Handbook for Congress, Congress should:

before trying to institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there is some other government program that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or eliminate it;

ask by what legal authority in the Constitution Congress undertakes an action ...;

recognize that when government undertakes a program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes voluntary association in civil society appear redundant, with significant negative effects; and

begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government programs that do what could be accomplished by voluntary associations in civil society ... recognizing that accomplishment through free association is morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates more efficient outcomes.

Every time taxes are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government program is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern themselves. It follows that there is a moral imperative for us to reclaim our right to live in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians « solve » our problems and run our lives.

### 2

The United States Federal Government should:

-create a National Institutes of Energy modeled on the National Institutes of Health.

-provide $15 billion per year to clean energy research and development projects.

Solves new clean tech

Josh Freed et al 9, vice president of the third way clean energy program, “Jumpstarting a Clean Energy Revolution with a National Institutes of Energy”, September, <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Jumpstarting_Clean_Energy_Sept_09.pdf>

When the United States faces a significant challenge and decides it is critical to act—sending a man to the moon, winning the Cold War, curing deadly disease—we make a national commitment and invest the resources necessary to meet it. Time and again, as the nation has confronted and overcome these clear imperatives, a substantial and sustained boost in federally supported research and development has been a key driver of our success. Getting America running on clean energy—the defining challenge and opportunity of our time—will require a new national commitment to energy innovation. Currently, the federal government lacks both the structure and the financing necessary to meet the energy challenge. The scale and complexity of the challenge before us demands a coordinated and well-funded national effort to transform the global energy sector, yet US policy in this area relies on haphazard financial and political support with little consistent direction. In order to jumpstart a clean energy revolution, the US government must increase its direct support for research and development of new and existing clean energy technologies and create a new structure for energy research that ensures coordination and maximizes its effectiveness. A successful national energy R&D program capable of driving the innovation necessary to make clean energy cheap must embrace two key components: 1. Increase federal investment in energy R&D by $15 billion per year In line with President Obama’s budget request,1 the scale of investment for comparable national priorities, and the recommendations of innovation experts, we propose a sustained $15 billion per year increase in federal clean energy R&D to approximately $20 billion per year.2 This level of funding is necessary to both create new breakthrough technologies and drive improvements to existing technology, enabling the production of clean energy at significantly higher efficiencies and lower costs. 2. Create a National Institutes of Energy Modeled on the National Institutes of Health, a new National Institutes of Energy (NIE) would effectively apply R&D funding to the goal of developing new, low-cost commercial clean energy technologies. The NIE would function as a nationwide network of regionally based, commercially focused, and coordinated innovation institutes. Alongside other effective federal energy R&D agencies, a new NIE would critically strengthen the U.S. clean energy innovation system. Currently, the United States does not have the full portfolio of technologies it needs to transition to clean, affordable energy, and we are not moving quickly enough to develop them. There is widespread agreement among innovation experts and energy researchers that neither the private sector nor the federal government is sufficiently invested in creating the new technologies we need or improving the technologies we have today. Only the federal government is able to provide the additional $15 billion in sustained annual funding energy experts believe is necessary to develop clean, affordable energy technologies.

### 3

#### Will pass—top of docket

Clifford, 12/30 (Mike, 12/30/2013, “Immigration Reform Supporters: “Positive Signs” Headed into 2014,” <http://www.publicnewsservice.org/2013-12-30/immigrant-issues/immigration-reform-supporters-positive-signs-headed-into-2014/a36538-1)>)

NEW YORK - Supporters of comprehensive immigration reform fell short of their goal in 2013, but several things happened in December to swing momentum in their direction, they say. The first positive sign, according to Jim Wallis, Sojourners president and founder, was the House and Senate working together to pass a budget bill.

And, while Speaker Boehner has said immigration reform would have to wait until next year, Wallis said there are signs Republicans are ready to act.

"I hear Republican leaders - Goodlatte from Judiciary - saying this will be a top priority in 2014," Wallis said. "John Boehner has hired a really talented aide to help with immigration - she knows the topic well, and she's for reform."

At his final 2013 news conference, President Obama called on House members to pass the immigration reform measure approved by the Senate, but Speaker Boehner has said he won't bring that version up for a vote.

Patty Kupfer, managing director, America's Voice, said key Republicans like Long Island Congressman Peter King either need to step up and co-sponsor the Senate-passed bill or reach across the aisle to a Democrat and craft a bill themselves.

"Peter King is probably one of about 40 Republicans who we see as critical to moving reform forward," Kupfer said, "and if they don't like what's on the table, they need to be able to produce something and say what they stand for."

#### ( ) Obama’s capital key to ensuring passage

Orlando Sentinel, 11/1 (11/1/2013, “What we think: It'll take both parties to clear immigration logjam,” <http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-11-01/news/os-ed-immigration-reform-congress-20131031_1_immigration-reform-comprehensive-reform-house-republicans>, JMP)

For those who thought the end of the government shutdown would provide a break from the partisan bickering in Washington, think again. The battle over comprehensive immigration reform could be every bit as contentious.

Polls show the popular momentum is there for comprehensive reform, which would include a path to citizenship for many of the nation's 11 million undocumented immigrants. But it'll take plenty of political capital from President Obama and leaders in both parties on Capitol Hill to make it happen.

Immigration-reform activists, who have been pushing for reform for years, are understandably impatient. This week police arrested 15 who blocked traffic at a demonstration in Orlando.

There are plenty of selling points for comprehensive immigration reform. An opportunity for millions of immigrants to get on the right side of the law. Stronger border security. The chance for law enforcement to focus limited resources on real threats to public safety, instead of nannies and fruit pickers. A more reliable work force to meet the needs of key industries. Reforms to let top talent from around the world stay here after studying in U.S. universities.

The Senate passed its version of comprehensive immigration in June. It includes all of the benefits above. Its path to citizenship requires undocumented immigrants to pay fines, learn English, pass a criminal background check and wait more than a decade.

So far, House Republicans have balked, taking a piecemeal rather than comprehensive approach. Many members fear being challenged from the right for supporting "amnesty."

Yet polls show the public supports comprehensive reform. In June, a Gallup poll found 87 percent of Americans — including 86 percent of Republicans — support a pathway to citizenship like the one outlined in the Senate bill.

Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio took flak from tea-party supporters for spearheading the comprehensive bill. Now, apparently aiming to mend fences, he says immigration should be handled piecemeal. He's politically savvy enough to know that's a dead end.

But comprehensive reform won't have a chance without President Obama making full use of his bully pulpit to promote it, emphasizing in particular all that undocumented immigrants would need to do to earn citizenship. House Democratic leaders will have to underscore the president's message.

And House Republican leaders will need to convince their members that comprehensive reform would be better for the economy, better for security, and better for the future of their party.

#### **The plan destroys obama’s agenda and the link turns the case**

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Increasing green cards generates an effective base of IT experts- solves cybersecurity

McLarty 9 (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

¶ We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States.¶ We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the United States, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward.¶ MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen, I think, our system, our security needs.

#### Cyberterrorism will cause accidental launch that triggers the Dead Hand and nuclear war

Fritz 9 (Jason, BS – St. Cloud, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, Study Commissioned on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, July, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.doc)  
  
*Direct control of launch*   
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential “electronic back door into the US Navy’s system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines” (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. “ \*\*[they cut off the paragraph]\*\* “In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.

### 4

#### Oil prices are stable and are trending upwards but new energy policies like the plan change predictions

Fathi 11/17 (Saadalah al Fathi, 11/17/13, Alwababa, What does OPEC think about the future of oil?, http://www.albawaba.com/business/opec-534141, HSA)

The new ‘World Oil Outlook’ report from Opec, according to its secretary-general Abdullah Salem Al Badri, “aims to share Opec’s views on the world’s energy prospects, and its associated challenges and opportunities.” The report, in its seventh edition, “discusses the principal issues that could shape the future of the global energy markets, particularly in relation to oil.”¶ The report assumes oil prices to remain stable in the long run as the rising cost of the marginal barrel would prevent their drop and, therefore, in nominal terms, a $110 per barrel on average up to 2020 and then rising gradually to $160 a barrel by 2035...which is only $100 a barrel in real terms.¶ Economic growth will always be the main driver of the energy market and there are signs of an improving outlook such as the fact that the average annual growth is expected to be 3.8 per cent up to 2018 and 3.5 per cent for the rest of the period.¶ The world population of seven billion in 2012 is forecast by the UN to increase to 8.6 billion in 2035, with 63 per cent living in cities and, therefore, dependent on energy and oil requirements.¶ Energy policy, especially in developed countries, the encouragement for the use of biofuels, environmental policies skewed against fossil fuels and the high level of taxation on petroleum products would all impact the forecasts. Take for example the EU’s aim of using 10 per cent biofuel in its energy mix by 2020. This is highly questionable with the European Parliament looking at 6 per cent only.

#### New energy tech leads to OPEC flooding the oil market – turns solvency and lowers prices

Energy Tech Stocks 8—quoting Dr. Marcel, Ph.D. in IR and Senior Research Fellow at the Chatham House (“Petro-politics Expert Marcel: Saudis Have Oil But Not Enough; OPEC May Flood Market To Hurt New Techs,” 27 January 2008, <http://energytechstocks.com.previewmysite.com/wp/?cat=15&paged=2>, AMiles)

Saudi Arabia still has a lot of oil; nevertheless, the world doesn’t have enough to meet forecasted demand of roughly 115 million barrels a day by 2030, a more than 30% increase over today’s 87 million barrel daily consumption. Shorter term, should OPEC members feel threatened by new alternative energy technologies, they very well may flood the market, temporarily driving crude prices down in order to make the new technologies appear financially unattractive. That’s the analysis of Valerie Marcel, a Dubai-based petro-politics expert and the author of “Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East.” During a lengthy conversation, Marcel, who is an associate fellow at UK-based Chatham House, one of Europe’s leading foreign policy think-tanks, told EnergyTechStocks.com that she wasn’t optimistic that oil shortages can be avoided, despite growing recognition of the problem in major oil-consuming nations. Marcel further said that the Saudi national oil company – Saudi Aramco – appears worried about fuel cell vehicles and other attempts by the world to wean itself off oil, and that should it and other OPEC members feel threatened, they would “play hardball,” flooding the market in an attempt to derail the new technologies. Marcel said that after 36 separate interviews with oil company officials, she believes Saudi Arabia probably has about 75 years of reserves remaining at current production rates, and that the Kingdom is capable of raising daily production from around nine million barrels a day currently to a sustained 12.5 million per day, which is its plan. At the same time, Marcel said she understands why, given the Kingdom’s self-imposed secrecy surrounding its oil industry, the world keeps asking, “Why should we trust them?”

#### Low prices undermine Putin’s regime and collapse the Russian economy

Kramer 12 – New York Times writer and editor (ANDREW E. “Higher Oil Prices to Pay for Campaign Promises” New York Times March 16, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/business/global/vladimir-putins-big-promises-need-fueling-by-high-oil-prices.html?\_r=2?pagewanted=print Putin Needs ajones)

MOSCOW — In American presidential politics, high oil prices are a problem. For Vladimir V. Putin’s new presidential term in Russia, they will be a necessity — crucial to fulfilling his campaign promises to lift government spending by billions of dollars a year. But doing that without busting the Kremlin’s budget would require oil to reach and sustain a price it has never yet achieved — $150 a barrel, according to one estimate by Citigroup. No wonder economists who specialize in Russia are skeptical. (On Friday, Russia’s Ural Blend export-grade oil was trading at $120 on the global spot market.) “It’s very hard to overestimate how vulnerable the Russian economy is to external pressures” from the oil price, Sergei Guriev, the rector of the New Economic School in Moscow, said in a telephone interview. “That vulnerability is huge, which is why Russia must be very vigilant. The spending is a risk.” The promised spending is also ambitious. Mr. Putin has laid out a program of raising wages for doctors and teachers, padding retirement checks for everyone and refurbishing Russia’s military arsenal. The oil-lubricated offerings would even include a population premium: expanding the popular “baby bonus” payments the Russian government provides to mothers, to include a third child. The payment, of up to $8,300 for housing or baby-related expenses, now comes as an incentive only with each of the first two children. The additional cost of the expanded baby benefits alone will total $4.6 billion a year, according to an estimate by the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. Most of Mr. Putin’s spending promises came at least partly in response to the street demonstrations by young and middle-class protesters in Moscow and other big cities challenging his authority in the weeks leading up to the March 4 election. His apparent aim was to shore up support from the rest of Russia: poorer and rural parts of the country, and from state workers and the elderly. The repercussions of his campaign promises, and an earlier commitment on military spending, could be felt for years to come, giving price swings in oil a bigger role than ever on the Russian economy. Taxes on oil and natural gas sales provide half of Russia’s government revenue. Each increase in the Russian budget equivalent to 1 percent of the gross domestic product requires a rise in the price of oil of about $10 a barrel on global markets — which is how Citigroup arrived at the $150-a-barrel figure for meeting the new obligations Mr. Putin has taken on. Analysts worry that, even if the government can fulfill its promises, too little will remain for a sovereign wealth fund that is intended as a shock absorber for the Russian economy and the ruble exchange rate during an oil price slump. Russia needed to use that buffer as recently as 2008, during the financial crisis. “The concern is simple,” Kingsmill Bond, the chief strategist at Citigroup in Russia, said in a telephone interview. “If the oil price that Russia requires to balance its budget is higher, the systemic risks that the market faces are also higher.” The bank estimated that Mr. Putin’s promises of higher wages and pensions, not counting the military outlays, add up to additional spending equal to 1.5 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product. That comes on top of an earlier pledge to spend an additional 3 percent of gross domestic product a year re-arming the military. In all, the new commitments would add up to about $98 billion a year, Citigroup estimates. The spillover from the Arab Spring and the specter of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear development plants are propping up oil prices now. But over the long term, economic stagnation in Europe could help bring them down. Even before the election, Russia’s government spending was up, helping reinforce Mr. Putin’s message that he was the best candidate to deliver prosperity and stability. In January, the Russian military ministry, for example, doubled salaries in the nation’s million-person army. It was ostensibly a long-planned move. But coming just two months before the presidential vote, the political message was clear. Also smoothing the path for Mr. Putin’s victory was a national cap on utility rates that helped keep inflation at the lowest level in Russia’s post-Soviet history for January and February, at a 3.7 percent annual pace. “Putin made large spending commitments,” the Fitch rating agency said in a statement released the day after the election. “The current high price of oil cushions Russia’s public finances,” Fitch said. “But in the absence of fiscal tightening that significantly cuts the non-oil and gas fiscal deficit, a severe and sustained drop in the oil price would have a damaging impact on the Russian economy and public finances and would likely lead to a downgrade” of the nation’s credit rating. As Mr. Putin’s spending promises started to be introduced in January, Fitch altered Russia’s outlook to stable, from positive. Mr. Putin has defended the proposed spending as necessary and just, given the hardship of teachers and other public sector workers in the post-Soviet years. “A doctor, a teacher, a professor, these people should make enough money where they work so they don’t have to look for a side job,” Mr. Putin wrote in a manifesto published during the campaign. But in fact, the government will offset a portion of the pay raises, perhaps as much as one-third of their cost, by laying off some public sector workers and trimming some other public spending. That was the word from Lev I. Yakobson, the deputy rector of the Higher School of Economics, who helped draft the policy. That part of the plan, though, was never part of Mr. Putin’s stump speech.

#### That goes nuclear

Filger 9 – Sheldon Filger, columnist and founder of GlobalEconomicCrisis.com, May 10, 2009, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis\_b\_201147.html

The Medvedev/Putin regime has initiated a host of policy responses to mitigate the impact of the Global Economic Crisis on the nation's fragile economy. Time will determine their long-term effectiveness; however, in the short-term some measures have proven more efficacious than others. A major goal of Moscow's economic technocrats has been to stabilize the country's banking system, and for the time being a degree of success has been achieved through government provision of liquidity to financial institutions. However, this complex geopolitical space that is Russia is now facing a vast array of complex challenges that other members of the G8 are spared, despite the destructive impact of the global synchronized recession facing all major industrialized countries.

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash.

Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world.

During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### 5

#### Chinese engagement with Latin America is trending upwards – it’s key to CCP export markets and energy imports

Myers and Hongbo 13 (Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue, Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, each answering a question from the Inter-American Dialogue “How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210)

A: Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue: "Latin America became a strategically important market for Chinese exporters a few years ago following decreases in demand for Chinese goods from Europe and the United States. Chinese exports to Europe fell 9 percent in 2011 in comparison with export levels in 2010, for example, and exports to the United States fell 5 percent. As U.S. and European demand continues to lag, Latin American nations should expect sustained interest in their markets and new market- and efficiency-seeking investments. As China continues its process of industrial upgrading, Latin America will also see more in the way of high-tech goods, as well as marketing of distinctly Chinese brands. Chinese cars are already being sold in several Latin American countries, including Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. And Chinese cell phones and computers are increasingly popular among Latin American consumers. As the former LAC director general at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yang is uniquely familiar with both the promises and pitfalls of trade with Latin America. While Latin America remains an appealing market for exports, Chinese producers and officials are painfully aware of growing protectionism in response to China's market-seeking endeavors. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences cited nationalization and trade protectionism trends among the top 20 notable events in the region in 2012. China expects to avoid protectionist measures by building mutually beneficial, 'win-win' trade relations. Chinese government and commercial entities in Latin America will indeed be working to build stronger trade relations in the coming years." A: Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing: "China regards Latin America as a promising strategic trade partner not only for diversifying export destinations, but also for safeguarding commodity import security. According to official statistics, Chinese exports to Latin America represented 6.74 percent of its total exports for the first nine months of 2012. Compared to the United States, European Union and Asia, Latin America has absorbed a marginal share of China's fast export expansion. From 2003 to 2011, the region's share of China's export volume only rose from 2.71 percent to 6.41 percent. Chinese policymakers expect to build a more sustainable and balanced trade relationship with Latin America. This issue has been widely negotiated both in political and commercial circles from the two sides. However, the bilateral effort still needs to find an efficient way to achieve satisfactory results, particularly for those countries that have a trade deficit with China. China continues to increase its imports from Latin America-with the region supplying 3.62 percent of China's total imports in 2003 to 7.13 percent in 2012. China's slowdown in 2012 caused serious concern in commodity-exporting countries in South America. Nonetheless, Chinese trade with Latin America in 2012 is estimated at more than $250 billion, higher than the year prior. Chinese business groups will attach great importance to the market volume in Latin America, but the export opportunities will also depend on strong economic growth in this region. In 2013, China's highlighted macroeconomic policy device for sustaining stable growth is to accelerate the pace of high-quality urbanization, which will necessitate increasing imports of mineral, agricultural and energy products from Latin America."

#### Bolstering US influence pushes China out – Columbia proves it determines contracts

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### China’s exports are key to a sustainable economy – recent shocks mean it’s on the brink

Holland 7/9 (Tom, writer of the South China Morning Post’s Monitor column, internally citing statistics from ADBI, the Asian Development Bank Institute, Dr. Yuqing Xing, professor of economics an director of Asian economic policy at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, PhD in economics from the University of Illinois—Urbana-Champaign, MA and BA from Peking University, South China Morning Post Monitor, July 9, 2013, “Despite rebalancing, exports still vitally important to China,” <http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1278239/despite-rebalancing-exports-still-vitally-important-china>, alp)

Unfortunately, the figure for gross exports isn't much use either. In an economy where all the value of all exports was produced domestically, then gross exports would give a good idea of external demand. But real supply chains don't work like that. Chinese factories import flash memory chips from Japan, displays from Korea and processors from the United States, which they then assemble into smartphones for sale around the world. So although the face value of China's exports may be high, the value added by China's factories is often relatively low. But although gross exports aren't much help in gauging the true importance of external demand, net exports don't work either. If all China's imports were components destined for re-export, the net figure would do the trick. But they aren't. Imports are also consumed domestically, not least by Chinese buying their own smartphones. To estimate the real contribution of external demand, we would have to account for the proportion of China's imports destined for re-export after assembly. Although these processing imports have fallen relative to China's total imports over recent years, as the first chart shows, they still make up a sizeable share of China's overall inbound goods trade. In an attempt to do exactly that, Xing Yuqing and Manisha Pradhananga at the Asian Development Bank Institute have come up with a measure of external demand which strips out China's processing imports. Then, for good measure, they have factored in an allowance for foreign direct investment into China, which remains driven largely by external, rather than domestic, demand. They found that although the share of external demand in China's GDP has fallen from its high of 28 per cent reached in 2007, in 2011 it still accounted for 22 per cent of overall economic output. As the second chart shows, that's 10 times as great as the share implied by the net export figure commonly used by economists. Xing and Pradhananga conclude that despite efforts to rebalance the economy towards domestic consumption, China is still heavily dependent on demand from the rest of the world, and that its growth remains highly vulnerable to external shocks. In other words, if tomorrow's trade numbers are as dismal as many analysts expect, it will be an ominous sign indeed for China's growth outlook.

#### Chinese economic decline goes global and causes nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 – professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### Case

#### No impact to heg – empirics

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs at U.S. Naval War College (Christopher J., “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Informaworld, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilizing power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

#### Their internal link can’t affect the structural factors their impact ev points to

Maher 11—adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1, Amiles)

The United States should start planning now for the inevitable decline of its preeminent position in world politics. By taking steps now, the United States will be able to position itself to exercise maximum influence beyond its era of preponderance. This will be America’s fourth attempt at world order. The first, following World War I and the creation of the League of Nations, was a disaster. The second and third, coming in 1945 and 1989-1991, respectively, should be considered significant achievements of U.S. foreign policy and of creating world order. This fourth attempt at world order will go a long way in determining the basic shape and character of world politics and international history for the twenty-first century. The most fundamental necessity for the United States is to create a stable political order that is likely to endure, and that provides for stable relations among the great powers. The United States and other global stakeholders must prevent a return to the 1930s, an era defined by open trade conflict, power competition, and intense nationalism. Fortunately, the United States is in a good position to do this. The global political order that now exists is largely of American creation. Moreover, its forward presence in Europe and East Asia will likely persist for decades to come, ensuring that the United States will remain a major player in these regions. The disparity in military power between the United States and the rest of the world is profound, and this gap will not close in the next several decades at least. In creating a new global political order for twenty-first century world politics, the United States will have to rely on both the realist and liberal traditions of American foreign policy, which will include deterrence and power balancing, but also using international institutions to shape other countries’ preferences and interests. Adapt International Institutions for a New Era of World Politics. The United States should seek to ensure that the global rules, institutions, and norms that it took the lead in creating—which reflect basic American preferences and interests, thus constituting an important element of American power—outlive American preeminence. We know that institutions acquire a certain ‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics. The transaction costs of creating a whole new international—or even regional— institutional architecture that would compete with the American post-World War II vintage would be enormous. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), all reflect basic American preferences for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, have near-universal membership and overwhelming legitimacy. Even states with which the United States has significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement—China, Russia, and Iran—have strongly desired membership in these ‘‘Made in USA’’ institutions. Shifts in the global balance of power will be reflected in these institutions—such as the decision at the September 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase China’s voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European countries such as Britain and France. Yet these institutions, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, will disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled position in world politics. In this sense, the United States will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values. Importantly, the United States should seek to use its vast power in the broad interest of the world, not simply for its own narrow or parochial interests. During the second half of the twentieth century the United States pursued its own interests but also served the interests of the world more broadly. And there was intense global demand for the collective goods and services the United States provided. The United States, along with Great Britain, are history’s only two examples of liberal empires. Rather than an act of altruism, this will improve America’s strategic position. States and societies that are prosperous and stable are less likely to display aggressive or antagonistic behavior in their foreign policies. There are things the United States can do that would hasten the end of American preeminence, and acting in a seemingly arbitrary, capricious, and unilateral manner is one of them. The more the rest of the world views the American-made world as legitimate, and as serving their own interests, the less likely they will be to seek to challenge or even transform it.19 Cultivate Balance of Power Relationships in Other Regions. The United States enjoys better relations with most states than these states do with their regional neighbors. South and East Asia are regions in which distrust, resentment, and outright hostility abound. The United States enjoys relatively strong (if far from perfect) strategic relationships with most of the major states in Asia, including Japan, India, Pakistan, and South Korea. The United States and China have their differences, and a more intense strategic rivalry could develop between the two. However, right now the relationship is generally stable. With the possible exception of China (but perhaps even Beijing views the American military presence in East Asia as an assurance against Japanese revanchism), these countries prefer a U.S. presence in Asia, and in fact view good relations with the United States as indispensable for their own security.

**Econ resilient—empirics**

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One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world,was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s.  Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression."  Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets.  Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization.  One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaringdebt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.  A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstablecountries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but itdoes reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"  This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakesonce this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies.  It's true that the massive stateinterventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit.  Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think.

#### No US lashout

Parent 11—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami—AND—Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Joseph M., Spring 2011, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034, RBatra)

With regard to militarized disputes, declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes, and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2).68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist’s argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers.69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively, declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims, or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers.

#### No impact to the aff – regionalism is coming now and solves sp

Krishnan Srinivasan, "International Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century," THE ROUND TABLE v. 98 n. 400, 2009, pp. 37-47.

The new world order of the ﬁrst half of the present century will be one of peaceful mutual accommodation between the big powers located in the East and West, North and South. The priority for these powers will be for economic progress and regional order, with defence expenditure being used to build technological capacity for deterrence against the other big powers and as an enabler for their self-appointed but globally recognized role as regional enforcers. In this neo-Hobbesian world system, the lesser states will come to their own bilateral arrangements with the local regional hegemon upon whom they will be dependent not only for their security but for economic, technical and trading facilitation. Some of these lesser entities will enjoy economic prosperity, depending on their ability to maintain internal cohesion, to turn globalization to their advantage, and to control the socio-economic consequences of climate change, but they will not be able to mount a challenge to the hierarchical nature of international society. They will have far greater recourse to the United Nations than the major powers, who will prefer to apply unilateral methods with the connivance and consent of their peers. The debate between Westphalian national sovereignty and the right to intervene to breach the sovereignty of other states on the grounds of preventing threats to international peace and security will not be resolved. Political and economic inequality between nations will be drawn in ever sharper focus. Regional institutions will be dominated by the local big power. Reform of the United Nations will be incomplete and unappealing to the vast majority of member states. The world’s hegemonic powers will lose faith in the Security Council as an effective mechanism to deliberate issues of peace and security. World bodies will be used for discussion of global issues such as the environment and climate change, pandemic disease, energy and food supplies, and development, but resulting action will primarily devolve on the big powers in the affected regions. This will particularly be the case in the realm of peace and security in which only the regional hegemon will have the means, the will and the obligation, for the sake of its own status and security, to ensure resolution or retribution as each case may demand. Even in a globalized world, regional and local action will be the prime necessity and such action will be left to the power best equipped to understand the particular circumstances, select the appropriate remedy and execute the action required to administer it. Conﬂict will be contained and localized. There will be no menace of war on a world-wide scale and little fear of international terrorism. Private-enterprise terrorist actions will continue to manifest political, social and economic frustrations, but they will be parochial, ineffective and not state-sponsored. There will be far less invocation of human rights in international politics, since these will be identiﬁed with a western agenda and western civilization: there will be an equal recognition of community rights and societal values associated with Eastern and other traditions. Chinese artists, Indian entrepreneurs, Russian actors, Iranian chefs, South African song-writers and Brazilian designers will be household names; models on the fashion cat-walk and sporting teams from all major countries will be distinctly multi-racial, reﬂecting the immigration to, but also the purchasing power of, the new major powers. National populations will show evidence of mixed race more than ever before in history. Climate change will be an acknowledged global challenge and all countries, led by the regional hegemons, will undertake binding restraints on carbon emissions. The world will become acutely conscious of the essentiality of access to fresh water. The pace of technological innovation will accelerate at dizzying speed, further accentuating inequalities. There will be very rapid steps taken to develop alternative sources of energy in the face of dwindling and costly oil supplies. Western industrialized nations, to remain competitive, will vacate vast areas of traditional manufacturing in favour of new technologies and green engineering. The world will be a safer and stable place until one of the hegemons eventually develops an obvious ascendancy ﬁrst regionally, then continentally and ﬁnally globally over all the others.

#### Attempts to gain sp only create opportunities for countries to soft balance the us – turns solvency

Michael J. Mazarr, Professor, National Security Strategy, U.S. National War College, "The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 35 n. 4, Fall 2012, p. 14-15.

Diplomacy increasingly fails. A parallel risk has to do with the ebbing force of U.S. diplomacy and influence. International power is grounded in legitimacy, and in many ways it is precisely the legitimacy of the leading power’s global posture that is under assault as its posture comes into question. Historically, rising challengers gradually stop respecting the hegemon’s right to lead, and they begin to make choices on behalf of the international community, in part due to strategies consciously designed to frustrate the leading power’s designs. Germany, under Bismarck and after, is one example: It aspired to unification and to its ‘‘rightful place’’ as a leading European power as its power and influence accumulated, its willingness to accept the inherent legitimacy of the existing order as defined by other states, and the validity and force of their security paradigms, declined proportionately. At nearly all points in this trajectory, German leaders did not seek to depose the international system, but to crowd into its leadership ranks, to mute the voices of others relative to its own influence, and to modify rather than abolish rules.¶ We begin to see this pattern today with regard to many emerging powers, but especially of course, China’s posture toward the United States.31 As was predicted and expected in the post-Cold War context of growing regional power centers, the legitimacy of a system dominated by the United States is coming under increasing challenge. More states (and, increasingly, non-state actors) want to share in setting rules and norms and dictating outcomes.¶ The obvious and inevitable result has been to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy. While measuring the relative success of a major power’s diplomacy over time is a chancy business (and while Washington continues to have success on many fronts), the current trajectory is producing a global system much less subject to the power of U.S. diplomacy and other forms of influence. Harvard’s Stephen Walt catalogues the enormous strengths of the U.S. position during and after the Cold War, and compares that to recent evidence of the emerging limits of U.S. power. Such evidence includes Turkey’s unwillingness to support U.S. deployments in Iraq, the failure to impose U.S. will or order in Iraq or Afghanistan, failures of nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran, the Arab Spring’s challenges to long-standing U.S. client rulers, and more.32 As emerging powers become more focused on their own interests and goals, their domestic dynamics will become ever more self-directed and less subject to manipulation from Washington, a trend evident in a number of major recent elections.¶ Washington will still enjoy substantial influence, and many states will welcome (openly or grudgingly) a U.S. leadership role. But without revising the U.S. posture, the gap between U.S. ambitions and capabilities will only grow. Continually trying to do too much will create more risk of demands unmet, requests unfulfilled, and a growing sense of the absurdity of the U.S. posture. Such a course risks crisis and conflict. Similarly, doubt in the threats and promises underpinning an unviable U.S. security posture risks conflict: U.S. officials will press into situations assuming that their diplomacy will be capable of achieving certain outcomes and will make demands and lay out ultimatums on that basis only to find that their influence cannot achieve the desired goals, and they must escalate to harsher measures. The alternative is to shift to a lesser role with more limited ambitions and more sustainable legitimacy.

**--Rising CO2 spurs plant growth ---- prevents famine ensuring global peace**

**Idso ‘99** (Dr. Sherwood, President, former Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service at the U.S. Water Conservation Laboratory in Phoenix, Arizona and Dr. Keith, Ph.D. in Botany at Arizona State University, President and Vice President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, CO2 Science, “Give Peace a Chance by Giving Plants a Chance”, Vol. 2, No. 19, 10-1, <http://www.co2science.org/scripts/CO2ScienceB2C/articles/V2/N19/EDIT.jsp>, CMR)

President Carter begins by stating that "when the Cold War ended 10 years ago, we expected an era of peace" but got instead "a decade of war." He then asks why peace has been so elusive, answering that most of today's wars are fueled by poverty, poverty in developing countries "whose economies depend on agriculture but which lack the means to make their farmland productive." This fact, he says, suggests an obvious, but often overlooked, path to peace: "raise the standard of living of the millions of rural people who live in poverty by increasing agricultural productivity," his argument being that thriving agriculture, in his words, "is the engine that fuels broader economic growth and development, thus paving the way for prosperity and peace." Can the case for atmospheric CO2 enrichment be made any clearer? Automatically, and without the investment of a single hard-earned dollar, ruble, or what have you, people everywhere promote the cause of peace by fertilizing the atmosphere with carbon dioxide; for CO2 - one of the major end-products of the combustion process that fuels the engines of industry and transportation - is the very elixir of life, being the primary building block of all plant tissues via the essential role it plays in the photosynthetic process that sustains nearly all of earth's vegetation, which in turn sustains nearly all of the planet's animal life. As with any production process, the insertion of more raw materials (in this case CO2) into the production line results in more manufactured goods coming out the other end, which, in the case of the production line of plant growth and development, is biosphere-sustaining food. And as President Carter rightly states, "leaders of developing nations must make food security a priority." Indeed, he ominously proclaims in his concluding paragraph that "there can be no peace until people have enough to eat." Within this context, we recently completed a project commissioned by the Greening Earth Society entitled "Forecasting World Food Supplies: The Impact of the Rising Atmospheric CO2 Concentration," which we presented at the Second Annual Dixy Lee Ray Memorial Symposium held in Washington, DC on 31 August - 2 September 1999. We found that continued increases in agricultural knowledge and expertise would likely boost world food production by 37% between now and the middle of the next century, but that world food needs, which we equated with world population, would likely rise by 51% over this period. Fortunately, we also calculated that the shortfall in production could be overcome - but just barely - by the additional benefits anticipated to accrue from the many productivity-enhancing effects of the expected rise in the air's CO2 content over the same time period. Our findings suggest that the world food security envisioned by President Carter is precariously dependent upon the continued rising of the atmosphere's CO2 concentration. As Sylvan Wittwer, Director Emeritus of Michigan State University's Agricultural Experiment Station, stated in his 1995 book, Food, Climate, and Carbon Dioxide: The Global Environment and World Food Production, "The rising level of atmospheric CO2 could be the one global natural resource that is progressively increasing food production and total biological output, in a world of otherwise diminishing natural resources of land, water, energy, minerals, and fertilizer. It is a means of inadvertently increasing the productivity of farming systems and other photosynthetically active ecosystems. The effects know no boundaries and both developing and developed countries are, and will be, sharing equally." So, let's give peace a chance. Let's give plants a chance. And, while we're at it, let's give all of the world's national economies a chance as well. Let's let the air's CO2 content rise unimpeded, and let's let the peoples of the world reap the multitudinous benefits that come from the God-given - and scientifically proven - aerial fertilization effect of atmospheric CO2 enrichment. Let's live and let live. And let's let CO2 do its wonderful work of promoting world peace via the planet-wide prosperity that comes from enhanced agricultural productivity.

Multiple structural factors check hotspots

Alagappa 8 (Muthia, Distinguished Fellow @ Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy @ Tufts, “The Long Shadow,” International Affairs p. 512)

International political interaction among Asian states is for the most part rule governed, predictable, and stable. The security order that has developed in Asia is largely of the instrumental type, with certain normative contractual features (Alagappa 2003b). It rests on several pillars. These include the consolidation of Asian countries as modern nation-states with rule-governed interactions, wide- spread acceptance of the territorial and political status quo (with the exception of certain boundary disputes and a few survival concerns that still linger), a regional normative structure that ensures survival of even weak states and supports inter- national coordination and cooperation, the high priority in Asian countries given to economic growth and development, the pursuit of that goal through partici- pation in regional and global capitalist economies, the declining salience of force in Asian international politics, the largely status quo orientation of Asia's major powers, and the key role of the United States and of regional institutions in pre- serving and enhancing security and stability in Asia.

**Hotspots don’t escalate**

**Drenzer 10**- prof of pol sci at Fletcher (Daniel, 12/31, Foreign Policy, “Some desperately needed New Year’s resolutions for 2011” http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/31/some\_new\_years\_resolutions\_for\_the\_foreign\_policy\_community\_in\_2011, da 1/5, mat)

[Fill in the blank] is an "existential threat". This term of art has been on the rise for decades, but it seemed omnipresent this past year. To be sure, lots of actors face a lot of threats out there in world politics. The bar has to be pretty high, however, for something to be an "existential threat." For my money, it means that the country or its modus operandi could be completely extinguished. Using this criteria, there are no existential threats to the United States in the international system. In 2010, this term was increasingly used by Israelis with respect to Iran. So, let's stipulate that if Iran were ever to acquire/develop, say, a dozen nuclear weapons, then the country would represent an existential threat to Israel. Commentators who do this, however, would also need to stipulate that Israel, in possessing 60-85 warheads, has represented an existential threat to Iran for decades.

#### Heg inevitable – will check hotspots too

Drezner 7/29 (Daniel, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution, contributing editor to Foreign Policy/Foreign Affairs, former professor at the University of Chicago and the University of Colorado, Boulder, Drezner has received fellowships from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Harvard University. BA from Williams College, MA and PhD in international relations from Stanford University, The Spectator, June 29, 2013, “While Britain stagnates, America is roaring back,” <http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8946671/while-britain-stagnates-america-is-roaring-back/>, alp)

Predicting the decline of the United States has been in vogue since the birth of American hegemony. Sputnik, Vietnam, stagflation, budget deficits, trade deficits and even the end of the Cold War all triggered predictions of the end of America. With the 2008 financial crisis, however, there seemed to be a sense that this time was different. Tomes with titles like The Post-American World and The End of Influence began to appear on bookshelves. Germany’s finance minister confidently predicted that the United States was entering its last days as a financial superpower. Serious commentators spoke about how a ‘Beijing consensus’ would supplant the ‘Washington consensus’. America looked as if it would disappear in a vortex of debt. Fast forward to this year, and a funny thing has happened to American influence — it’s unbowed. The very suggestion that America may be strong enough not to need quantitative easing sent global financial markets into spasm last week. If America was coming off life support, then the subsidies for all kinds of financial packages would end. As one financial strategist told the New York Times, ‘The Fed isn’t just the US’s central bank. It’s the world’s central bank.’ This point was not lost in Britain, where government borrowing costs surged. It’s said that when America sneezes, Britain catches a cold. But even as America gets better, Britain can remain ill. For those in Britain who are constantly told that the crisis ‘started in America’, this must all look rather strange. If the crash was an American disease, then shouldn’t Uncle Sam be worst affected? How come the US is now free of bailed-out banks, having sold them at a tidy $25 billion profit, when Britain looks like it will be saddled with zombie banks for another decade? And given that the Obama administration has spent the last few years deadlocked with a bickering Congress, how have the obstacles to growth been removed so quickly? Well, for one thing, there are some constants to American power. Its healthy demographics fuelled by immigration, geographic security, a syncretic, dynamic popular culture, and excellence in higher education and innovation are unchanged. As in previous slumps, private sector and public sector adjustments have triggered a revival in American capabilities. And this can be traced to the fact that it responded to the shock of the 2008 financial crisis more adroitly than its rivals. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the United States has actually been deleveraging from the bubble years of the past decade. Yes, millions of households were in foreclosure in America three years ago — but taking the pain then has allowed recovery now. While commentators have focused on rising government debt, US households and companies have been tackling their own. According to the OECD, the debt-to-income ratio for American households has fallen from a pre-crisis 137 per cent to 116 per cent by the end of last year. That figure is now lower than European household indebtedness. Britain is at 160 per cent. It is true that government debt has soared under Barack Obama — but that is consistent with the successful path that Scandinavian countries pursued in the early 1990s in response to their own credit bubbles. State spending propped up these economies while voters paid off their debt, and then the resurgence in private-sector demand allowed governments to balance the books. This appears to be happening now in the United States. The US federal budget deficit has declined more dramatically in the past three years than at any time in postwar history. The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal budget deficit to fall to 2.1 per cent of economic output by 2015 — an astonishing turnaround from the 10.1 per cent figure four years ago. By the same year, Britain’s deficit will still be at 6 per cent of GDP — the highest in the western world. American manufacturing is also on a roll. Contrary to perceptions, US factory output has been robust and productive — the problem was that it had been haemorrhaging jobs over the past few decades. No longer. Manufacturing might never be the jobs engine that it was a century ago — but it will not be a drag on job creation either. Durable goods manufacturing has added more than half a million jobs over the past three years. The intriguing question is whether this trend can continue. A 2011 Boston Consulting Group study argues it can, given that China is not quite the cheap workshop it once was (with rising wages and an appreciating yuan). The ‘rebalancing’ that Brits hear about is happening in the US, with up to three million jobs expected to be created in the next few years. The optimism felt by American factories is easy to explain. Energy costs have plunged. The development of hydraulic fracturing, or ‘hydro-fracking’, has sent gas prices to less than a third the level charged in Europe — quite some factor if you’re an energy-hungry manufacturer wondering where in the world to locate. Time after time, the answer to this question is: America. There has long been talk in the US about ‘reshoring’, where US companies decide to create jobs in the rustbelt states that need them most. But all sorts of companies are coming to America. Voestalpine, an Austrian steel company, declared in March that it would build a €550 million plant in Texas, having rejected 16 other sites in seven other countries. With an economic recovery comes geopolitical clout. Late last year the International Energy Agency projected that by 2020 the United States would supplant Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer. By 2030, the United States would realise its longstanding dream of energy self-sufficiency. And while the US government can hardly be credited with the fracking revolution, the Obama administration did not bar its progress — more than can be said for many European governments, some of which are so wedded to the renewables agenda that they don’t want to accept the good news. In fact, the drama on Capitol Hill has diverted attention from the recovery underway in an America which is not connected to political wrangling. As Larry Summers once put it, ‘The great mistake of the gridlock theorists is to suppose that all progress comes from legislation and that more legislation consistently represents more progress.’ Even so, the US system of government has been surprisingly nimble despite its perceived political paralysis. In the five years since the financial crisis, Congress has passed legislation that saved the US financial system, rescued the car-making sector, enacted the largest fiscal stimulus programme in the world (which contained substantial tax cuts), overhauled its financial regulation, passed ambitious health-care legislation, and then took steps to control spending. This week, the House and Senate are moving forward on comprehensive immigration reform. Compared with Britain — or anywhere in Europe — the US has been a hive of productive political activity. By contrast, the emerging Brics, who were supposed to take over the world, have seen better days. Brazil is confronting massive protests from citizens angry that so much money is being spent to prepare for the World Cup. Russia’s energy boom is tapering off; Moscow finds itself starved of foreign capital due to the caprice of President Putin. China’s economic growth during the Great Recession has far outstripped the United States; and yet its new leadership is rejecting the ‘Beijing consensus’ as quickly as it can. Indeed China may be heading for its own credit crunch: in recent weeks, its bank lending rates have surged and one bank briefly defaulted. The country’s attempts to clamp down on the misallocation of cheap credit may well have triggered its latest bout of financial turmoil. There is no denying that the relative power of the United States is less now than it was a decade ago. And yet, five years after the start of the Great Recession, US power does not appear to be on the wane. If anything, the trendlines suggest the opposite. Even Arvind Subramanian, the author of Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance, has changed his tune a bit. In a recent paper he paraphrased Mark Twain, concluding: ‘Reports of the decline in American economic power appeared to have been exaggerated.’ Plenty of dangers lie ahead. The United States could get trapped into another draining war in the Middle East. Partisan bickering in Washington could block any structural budget reforms and cripple America’s long-term finances. A premature end to quantitative easing, or another eurozone crisis, could induce another setback. But the United States has a remarkable ability to right its own ship. That ability, in and of itself, is one of the sources of its enduring power.

**Soft power resilient—culture and political system**

**Nye 6** – IR Professor, Harvard (Joseph, 6/25, Why Do They Hate Us?, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/22/AR2006062200972\_pf.html, AG)

Fortunately, even when the U.S. government's foreign policies are unattractive to others, our culture and our open political processes can produce a "meta" form of soft power -- winning grudging admiration for our freedoms at the same time that our policies are unpopular. After all, anti-American protests were rampant around the world during the Vietnam War, but the protesters did not sing "The Internationale"; they sang the American civil rights anthem "We Shall Overcome." Today, the fact that America remains democratic and self-critical, that its free press exposes governmental flaws and that the legislative and judicial branches can act against the executive, means that anti-American critics of U.S. foreign policies can still feel a residual attraction to our society.

# 2NC

### 2NC – Overview (China econ) (0:20)

#### The CCP has meticulously planned Chinese growth to account for slowdowns, but they require exports to buttress their economy – declining demand in the US and Europe forces them to Latin America – that’s Holland.

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#### Exports are key to the economy – downturn collapses the CCP’s hold on power which causes nuclear lashout and global draw-in. That outweighs on magnitude. CCP irrationality and the perceptive nature of the internal link mean we win timeframe: you can only die once.

#### Independently, they conceded the economy impact in the Buzan and Foot ev – Chinese slowdown collapses global growth which turns the case:

Economic slowdown incentivizes Chinese aggression to counterbalance US naval deployment in the South China Sea which distracts from alternate US commitments and undermines unipolarity. Loose nuclear weapons collapse the nuclear taboo which takes away the US’s ultimate backstop against conflict. Chinese aggression towards Taiwan collapses the credibility of US security commitments which turns soft power. Chinese slowdown independently takes away a huge source of Cuban revenue and tech by collapsing Sino-Cuban trade which eliminates the resources for Cuban ethanol production.

### 2NC – AT: “Influence” high (retime)

#### US credibility is declining – even if they win that we’ve signed some trade deals, their ev doesn’t describe and compare trends of US and Chinese engagement holistically:

#### 1) Controversies prove – Snowden and spying destroyed US cred and encouraged economic counterbalancing which empowered anti-Capitalist groups who spun the US as imperialist. That caused Latin America to turn towards other trade powers in protest.

#### 2) Their ev cites rhetoric, not action – that’s not sufficient to trigger the DA

Padgett 5/27

[Timothy. Latin America Reporter for TIME “Why China Is Behind Fresh U.S. Moves In Latin America” WLRN – South Florida 5/27/13 <http://wlrn.org/post/why-china-behind-fresh-us-moves-latin-america>]

There are of course skeptics. I asked Robert Pastor, a former White House national security advisor for Latin America and now an international relations professor at American University in Washington, D.C., if he thinks the U.S. is doing enough to keep itself relevant in the Americas.¶ “No it’s not,” he says. “President Obama’s trip (to Mexico and Central America) is a good first step, but he needs to do a lot more to open up and show America’s interest in re-engaging with the rest of South America.”¶ Pastor has a point: for decades, Latin America has heard a lot of rhetoric from the U.S. about engagement -- the kind Biden offered the Council of the Americas in Washington recently, when he declared that the hemisphere “matters more (to the U.S.) today because it has more potential than any time in American history.”

#### 3) Security focus collapses economic engagement – the plan reverses that

Fossett 5/28

(Katelyn, “In U.S.-Mexico Relations, a Shift from Security to Economy,” Interpress Service News, [www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/in-u-s-mexico-relations-a-shift-from-security-to-economy/](http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/in-u-s-mexico-relations-a-shift-from-security-to-economy/))

Development’s Achilles heel¶ Still, for a country like Mexico that is still struggling with issues of citizen security and rampant crime, many suggest that economic growth would have to start from the bottom, with more robust social programmes and safety nets, before the international community becomes too optimistic about economic and trade booms.¶ Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin America programme at the Wilson Center, calls Latin America “far behind” in developing policies that might leverage inclusive growth.¶ “There is not a sense of shared responsibility … when your social policy is remittance, when your lack of social policy is permitted,” she told reporters on Friday. The region, she said, needs “a widespread recognition of the role the private sector needs to play in paying taxes, improving government … [and] institutions.”¶ In a telephone interview with IPS, she noted that the U.S. relationship with Central America is likely to remain more focused on security concerns.¶ “There is a growing consensus in the development community that sustainable growth can’t and will not happen unless levels of violence are brought under control,” she told IPS.¶ The World Bank recently called citizen insecurity the “Achilles’ heel of development” in Latin America.¶ Members of the U.S. Congress and advocacy groups here are also wary of turning a blind eye to human rights concerns in Mexico.¶ “The dire human rights situation in Mexico is not going to solve itself,” Maureen Meyer, a senior associate for Mexico and Central America with the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), an advocacy group, said in a statement.¶ “As the bilateral agenda evolves, it is critical that the U.S. and Mexican governments continue to focus on how best to support and defend human rights in Mexico.”¶ In a press release issued last week, WOLA expressed agreement with a letter from 23 members of Congress to Secretary of State John Kerry that stressed that “[t]he human rights crisis will not improve until there are stronger legal protections, increased human rights training for Mexico’s security forces, and more government agents held responsible for the human rights violations they commit.”¶ Even as the focus of U.S.-Mexico relations turns to economics, there is no broad agreement on how exactly a shift toward trade relations will strengthen the “economic competitiveness” of both countries.¶ “Part of the challenge is that we have this term, but we have a laundry list of issues that could fit into that term,” the Mexico Institute’s Chris Wilson said.¶ “What we still don’t have is a coherent agenda or a way in which the leadership from the top level can engage the public or business community or civil society … and create something more [meaningful],” he told IPS.

### 2NC – Link overview (0:55)

#### Latin American imports are finite and carefully calibrated to play to the strengths of a variety of trade partners. The aff swings the pendulum away from China, decreasing their exports to Latin America and hurting their economy – that’s Holland.

#### Their “not zero sum” arguments don’t assume the nuance of the link – we agree that trade and relations are not zero sum, but the aff’s [relations/multilat] advantage proves they substantially bolster the US’s regional influence by overcoming decades of perceived colonial paternalism.

#### That signal of reconciliation shifts regional consumption patterns away from Chinese goods – that’s Ellis. Proximity incentivizes states to purchase from the US as long as they no longer fear American manipulation of their markets

Ben Ami 13 (Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace “Is the US Losing Latin America?” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami)

Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

#### Empirics prove that trade credibility, not net trade, is the determining factor in market choices – Latin America will gravitate towards the US regardless of actual market competition

Ellis 2011(R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60\_85-91\_Ellis.pdf)//VP

It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

### 2NC – AT: Hegemony (empirics)

#### Empirics prove no impact to heg decline – that’s Fettweis:

#### a) Sequestration triggered their perception and drawback links but countries cut military spending – disproves adventurism.

#### b) Afghanistan and Iraq caused overstretch and tanked credibility – international backlash made achieving goals harder – proves we’ll use heg wrong if we have it.

#### c) No brink – 2008 recession proves either they’re wrong or the timeframe is massive.

#### Anglo-American transition proves

Parent 11—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami—AND—Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Joseph M., Spring 2011, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034, RBatra)

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, **periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone** than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation.

### 2NC – AT: Hegemony (i/l)

#### They don’t affect hegemony’s structural checks on war – that’s Maher:

#### a) Basing in Europe and Asia solves power projection– no drawdowns because of WW2 treaties.

#### b) Global institutions solve diplomacy which checks conflict and locks in stability for great powers who benefit from interdependence. Countries want strong relations with the US for protection.

#### c) Power disparity is sufficient – nuclear and naval deterrence solve escalation OR other countries are already ahead which means collapse is inevitable.

#### We’ll manage the transition which solves their impacts

Yi 9 [Xiaoxiong, professor of political science and director of the China Program at Marietta College, “American leadership in a non-polar world,” 12/30/09 http://www.zanesvilletimesrecorder.com/article/20091230/OPINION02/912300303]

In the coming "non-polar" world, no single power will run the show, nor will there be a group of powers such as China, India and Brazil as more or less "equal" powers with the United States, Japan and EU, managing the world system. Instead, the principal characteristic of non-polarity is that the world will be "influenced by dozens of state and non-state actors exercising various kinds of power," according to Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations. The emergence of a non-polar world can prove to be messy, complex and mostly negative. For one thing, as Haass points out, "more decision-makers make it more difficult to make decisions." The recent failure of world leaders to achieve a tough and binding greenhouse-gas reduction agreement in Copenhagen has brought into sharp focus a crisis of non-polarity. For another, without a uni-polar power center or a clearly defined multi-polar power structure, many of the most dangerous challenges we are facing today -- the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the genocide in Sudan and the surge in piracy off Somalia-will be hard to defuse or even contain. The consequences of the non-polarity may be dangerously destabilizing, but it is a mistake to conclude that a "growing vacuum of power" will inevitably lead to more conflict. Even in this emerging non-polar world, the United States remains to be the last guarantor of international security and global financial stability. There is simply no other alternative. In the coming decade, we can expect that power will continue to be diffused rather than concentrated in the world. But, as Richard Haass noticed, "This is not all bad news for the United States: the United States still retains more capacity than any other actor to improve the quality of the international system and Washington can still manage the transition and make the world a safer place." The challenge for the United States, however, is to understand the limits of America's reach and to embed America's hard power in a new form of "soft power" leadership. President Obama seems to have come to grasp with the essence of this emerging new world order -- that was perhaps why he was able to pull off what was possibly the only sensible deal in Copenhagen by working in tandem with the Chinese, Brazilian, Indian and South African leaders.

### 2NC – AT: Economy (resilient)

#### No collapse – economy’s resilient:

#### a) Empirics – 6 collapses prove no impact uniqueness. Intervening actors check escalation – their ev cites correlation, not causation – that’s Barnett.

#### b) Stimulus proves – interdependence creates an economic incentive to cooperate with trade partners. Deterrence solves small states, which are the only scenario for escalation.

#### The best studies go neg, alt causes, and democracy checks

Miller 2k – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm, AG)

Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to an outbreak of violence (while) in the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.

#### Most recent studies of the 2008 crisis prove

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. ¶ The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

### 2NC – AT: Economy (decoupling)

#### US economy not key to the world economy:

#### a) Empirics – 1987 crash didn’t trigger global collapse – existing volatility proves collapse is either inevitable or overdetermined.

#### b) Experts – Goldman-Sachs economists claim Asia’s an independent economic engine 2008 proves their debt went down while ours went up – that’s Wassener.

#### Our ev assumes the most current forecasts

Schwartz 9 (Nelson and Matthew Saltmarsh, Developing World Seen as Engine for Recovery, 24 June 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/25/business/global/25oecd.html, AMiles)

After bruising global downturns, the American economy has usually led the world back to growth, but developing countries could be the engine that powers the next recovery. Despite fears just months ago that they would be among the biggest victims of the financial crisis, emerging giants like China, India and Brazil are set to rebound strongly next year, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development predicted Wednesday — as Europe, the United States and Japan lag. “It’s good to have a locomotive out there pulling the train,” Ángel Gurría, the O.E.C.D.’s secretary general said, referring to China, India and Brazil. “But we can’t put the onus on their shoulders — they help, but they can’t get us out of the hole.” The divergence between the emerging and the developed countries suggests that the once-popular theory of decoupling — the notion that the emerging markets could be moving independently of the developed economies — may make a comeback. When the emerging markets were also brought low by the global financial crisis, the theory was abandoned for talk of “recoupling.” Now, is “re-decoupling” at hand? Mr. Gurría argues that the net result of faster emerging market growth would be “absolutely positive,” but he acknowledges that one early side effect is already evident in the form of surging oil prices, which have risen to nearly $70 a barrel, from $33 in February. “Why is oil doubling when we are in the deepest recession ever?” Mr. Gurría asked. “Decoupling is back as a thesis,” said Adam Posen, deputy director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “And we should recognize how different the current situation is from past crises.” Striking a somewhat optimistic note, the O.E.C.D. said that thanks to stimulus programs in the United States and elsewhere, the downturn appeared to be nearing bottom. It warned, however, that the recovery was likely to be fragile, with unemployment growing and unused production capacity remaining for years. And increased savings by American corporations and consumers could partly offset the stimulus, tamping down growth in the United States and around the world. Economists have furiously debated whether decoupling was taking place. It would mean a fundamental shift in the global economy — that traditionally dependent developing economies move according to their own fundamental trends rather than the ups and downs of the developed countries. Increasing independence could lead to increasing influence and a relative shift in global economic weight toward the emerging giants, especially China. The 30 industrialized members of the Paris-based policy and research group account for roughly 60 percent of global economic output. “I think it’s clear that the situation in emerging economies has changed if you compare it with where we were 15 years ago,” said Jorgen Elmeskov, acting head of the O.E.C.D.’s economics department. According to the O.E.C.D.’s semi-annual report, China could grow 7.7 percent this year and 9.3 percent next year, faster than previous estimates. India could grow 5.9 percent this year and 7.2 percent next year, and Brazil’s economy, after slowing down, will reverse this year and expand 4 percent next year. The O.E.C.D. predicted the United States economy would shrink by 2.8 percent this year and grow by 0.9 percent next year, a bit better than the flat performance the organization estimated in March. By contrast, the Japanese economy is expected to shrink 6.8 percent this year while Europe should contract 4.8 percent in 2009, with both regions hit harder than in earlier O.E.C.D. forecasts. The decoupling hypothesis has had nearly as many ups and downs as the global economy itself. As the post-World War II economy recovered and globalization took hold, economists detected a pattern in which a slowdown in the developed world led to an effect that made conditions far worse in poorer countries, said Mr. Posen. But by 2007 and 2008, he explained, decoupling was gaining currency as the United States economy slowed but Brazil, Russia, India and China continued to grow. When those countries then hit the wall late last year, it seemed as if the decoupling thesis was also dead. Now, he said, with China and other emerging countries seemingly leading the way, the idea that countries like China, India and Brazil are going to play a far bigger role in global economic expansion is coming back in vogue. If decoupling were a reality, it could be good for the developed countries, as growing wealth in China and India could, in theory, increase demand for goods made in recession-battered countries like Japan, Germany and the United States. (China and India might require import-oriented consumer economies for that to happen, which is not currently the case.)

# 1NR

#### Disad outweighs –

#### SIZE – Russian growth rates key to internal stability – collapse will destroy the global economy and result in nuclear strikes – only scenario for extinction

Bostrom 2 (Nick, Ph.D. in Philosophy – Oxford University and Winner – 2009 Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, 9, March, <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3] A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### SPEED –the link is immediate – perception of action causes OPEC to flood the market with cheap oil – that independently turns the case since the technology will become artificially unattractive to investors

#### SCOPE – moves away from oil dependence collapse global economic interdependence which controls the escalation of all global conflict – turns all of their cooperation impacts

Turns the case

#### Russian collapse will shift the balance of power away from the US towards China—this terminally jacks hegemony.

**Baran et al.** **7** (Senior Fellow and Director Center for Eurasian Studies, Hudson Institute. “U.S. – RUSSIAN RELATIONS : IS CONFLICT INEVITABLE?” Hudson Institute Symposium on US-Russian Relations, www.hudson.org/files/pdf\_upload/Russia-Web%20(2).pdf.

The West needs a stable Russia in order to maintain the global balance of power against China. In the event of Russia’s disintegration, her resources will go to China, not the West. The West cannot stop Russia’s slide into a systemic cri- sis, and can only help get out of it once it has begun. This is a challenge for the future. Currently, the West needs a “Cold War” only with Russia’s new masters, not with the Russian people. Russians are protesting against the politics of the Russian bureaucracy, and their protest should not be re-directed at the bureaucracy’s strategic partners in the West. If the West understands and accepts this, it needs to learn to acknowledge Russians’ rights to patriotism and to a normal level of freedom—not as a religious symbol, but as the only path to prosperity and justice. Russian “democrats” and “liberals” have forgotten these demands and rights, and therefore the terms “dem - o crat” and “liberal” are cursed in Russia. Official propa- ganda uses this to divert Russian citizens from asserting their interests and rights to fighting the West. The West needs to explain to Russia that these rights have been destroyed not by rivalry with the West, but solely by the avarice of the new Russian leaders. It is true that in the future, the issue of global competition will arise. Currently, however, there is only one key prob- lem—corruption (including, of course, corruption in the interests of the West) and a lack of bureaucratic integrity. After Russia experiences a systemic crisis the West must be able to say to Russians; “You see? We are for democracy, but not for “democrats,” for law, but not for lawyers, for prosperity, but not for prospering oligarchs.” All of these are things that the West could not say after the 1990s. Russia will be useful to the West if the West can side with Russia against China and global Islam in foreign policy and with the Russian people against the Russian bureaucracy in domestic policy. If the West attempts to transform Russia according to its own conceptualization of the correct societal order, or simply to seize Russian raw materials, intellect, and money, it will destroy Russia and pay dearly for the rela- tively small gain. **As a consequence** of doing so, **the West will experience large-scale, global systemic problems**.

#### Russia’s key to the global economy—the US is not

**Gilman** **8** (Former senior representative of the IMF in Russia and professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. “Well-Placed to Weather an Economic Storm,” Moscow Times, <http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2008/01/16/008.html>)

Faced with this gloomy global outlook, Russia is well placed to weather the storm. In fact, not only is the Russian economy **likely to decouple largely from a sagging U**nited **S**tates and even Europe, but its continuing boom -- mostly but not solely **fueled by high energy revenues** -- **is** sucking in both consumer and investment goods, and so **acting as a motor of world growth**. And the planned $1 trillion public investment program over the next decade should ensure that the country remains decoupled for years to come.

Lbl

### 2NC—AT: Oil Not Key (New)

#### Low prices undermine Putin’s regime and collapse the Russian economy-half rev

Kramer 12 – New York Times writer and editor (ANDREW E. “Higher Oil Prices to Pay for Campaign Promises” New York Times March 16, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/business/global/vladimir-putins-big-promises-need-fueling-by-high-oil-prices.html?\_r=2?pagewanted=print Putin Needs ajones)

#### Oil prices key to the Russian economy

**Schuman 12** (Michael, Asia and Economics Correspondent – TIME, B.A. in Asian History and Political Science – University of Pennsylvania, M.A. in International Affairs – Columbia University, “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices”, Time, 7-5, http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/, Deech)

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced **extremely high**. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its **economic performance**, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an **oil state** in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been **increasing**. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia **relies** heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil **lubricates** the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity.

#### Oil profits key to Russian economy --- controls 70% of export revenue

**Aron 13** (Leon, Resident Scholar and Director of Russian Studies – American Enterprise Institute, Ph.D. – Columbia University, “The political economy of Russian oil and gas”, American Enterprise Institute, 5-29, http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/europe/the-political-economy-of-russian-oil-and-gas/, Deech)

From less than 50 percent in the mid-1990s,[14] the share of commodities in Russian exports has grown to **70 percent** today, with oil accounting for more than half of the export income.[15] Representing up to 30 percent of the country’s GDP and half of its GDP growth since 2000,[16] hydrocarbons provided at least half of the state’s budget revenues last year.[17] Five years ago, Russia needed oil prices of $50 to $55 a barrel to balance its budget, but Alexei Kudrin, former first deputy prime minister and finance minister, estimated the breakeven price at $117 per barrel last year.[18] Russia’s **dependence** on energy exports—and, consequently, its economy’s **vulnerability** to commodity price fluctuation—was highlighted by the 2009 world financial crisis. As oil plunged from $147 to $34 per barrel, the resource-based economy contracted by almost 8 percent—the largest drop among the G20 top industrial nations. Russia has begun to exhibit the signs of what economists call the “Dutch disease,” when overreliance on commodity exports depresses other sectors of the economy by starving them of investments and modernization while the increasing value of the national currency makes exports of other goods and services more expensive and thus less competitive in world markets. Industrial stagnation has even spread to the military-industrial complex, which, like in Soviet times, continues to be the state’s favorite sector and enjoys its continuous and very generous support. Despite this, according to a recent survey, only 20 percent of the Russian defense enterprise qualified as “modern.”[19] As in virtually every other petro-gas state, the rise of the Russian one has been attended by corruption likely unprecedented even in the country’s far-from-pristine history. Venality and extortion have come close to subverting or even paralyzing governance, social institutions, justice, and entrepreneurial activity. In Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perception Index, Russia was 133rd among 176 countries, worse than Belarus, Vietnam, and Sierra Leone and on par with Honduras, Iran, and Kazakhstan.[20] Yet the most dangerous political legacy of the Russian petro-gas state is the **centrality** of oil and gas revenues, which amounted to $215 billion last year,[21] to the loyalty of two groups that are essential for the regime’s survival: the lower-income and elite segments. Trillion-ruble transfers help to maintain social peace in what is known as “Russia-2”[22]—poorer regions, especially the volatile and increasingly violent Muslim North Caucasus, small towns and rural areas, and the rusting “monotowns” (one-company towns) of Stalinist industrialization.[23]

#### Oil price drop annihilates the Russian economy

**RIA Novosti 13** (“$60 Oil Price Will Eat up Russia’s Oil Fund – Survey”, 1-29, http://en.rian.ru/business/20130129/179108381.html, Deech)

MOSCOW, January 29 (RIA Novosti) – Russia’s Oil Wealth Fund will be totally consumed if world oil prices plunge to $60 per barrel and stay at that level for a year, experts from the Russian School of Economics (VSE) said on Tuesday. That scenario presents “a **shock** not only for the budget system but also for the economy as a whole,” experts from the Higher School of Economics' Development Center said in their stress-test survey. The stark warning echoes the Precarious Stability scenario outlined by former Russian Finance Minister Kudrin at the World Economic Forum at Davos last week, which predicted an oil price plunge to $60 per barrel, forcing the Russian government to preserve social stability at the expense of economic development. Last week's Davos forum was presented with three broadly pessimistic scenarios for Russia’s economic development, based on a poll of over 350 Russian and foreign economists and decision-makers who warned that the Russian economy remained **acutely vulnerable** to world energy prices and could become more risky for investment. World prices for benchmark Brent crude have been hovering at about $110 per barrel in recent months, a level Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said was optimal for both oil consumers and producers. Kudrin warned on Monday that the eurozone sovereign debt crisis was continuing and the global crisis could worsen as soon as the end of this year, which would certainly cause a plunge in demand for oil and hence oil prices. That could **undermine** the Russian economy, which continues to **depend heavily** on raw material exports. The Russian 2013 budget is based on an oil price of $97 per barrel. Aside from Oil Wealth Fund depletion, “Russia’s GDP would **contract** by 5.9 percent compared with 2012 while budget revenues [would fall] by 3 trillion rubles ($100 billion) or 23 percent,” the VSE Development Center survey said. “The budget deficit would widen to 3.5 trillion rubles (6.4 percent of GDP) and the ruble’s average yearly rate would fall to 35.5 rubles to the dollar in 2013.”

### 2NC Adventurism

#### Russia could be imperialist even with a bad economy—it’s still far more powerful than its neighbors and there’s no impact

Adomanis 10(Mark, degrees in Russian studies from both Harvard and Oxford, “Russia’s economy: still not collapsing!” April 21,http://trueslant.com/markadomanis/2010/04/21/russias-economy-still-not-collapsing/)

And even if Russia’s economy doesn’t, as all of the relevant forecasts suggest, rapidly recover to pre-crisis levels, the Kremlin will nonetheless be able to exert a great degree of influence in the “near abroad” because of the extreme fiscal/economic weaknesses of the rest of the CIS. If the recent agreement with Ukraine or the recent Russian pressure on Kyrgyzstan demonstrate anything, it is that many of the former-Soviet states are in truly dire economic straights and that they are **extremely**vulnerable to outside leverage, particularly from a player as thoroughly amoral and hard-headed as Russia.

One doesn’t need to celebrate Russian influence in the “near abroad” to recognize its existence. I think that in certain countries, such as the Central Asian ‘Stans, Russian influence is and can continue to be modestly progressive. It’d be pretty difficult to be more authoritarian and backward looking than someone like [Turkmenbashi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saparmurat_Niyazov). In other countries, such as Georgia, Russian influence will in all likelihood take substantially harsher and less pleasant forms. The world’s a nasty place, though, and since the US and Europe are up against some pretty darn catastrophic resource constraints, the odds that the West will be able to effectively meddle in Russia’s “sphere of privileged interests” are pretty slim.

Russia is and will continue to be a great power. Not a superpower, but a great power. Some people will be overjoyed by this and some will be repulsed. Whatever your reaction, though, get used to the Russians being a major force in world politics.

#### Russia has abandoned aggression in favor of cooperation

Sawczak 11 [Dr. Peter Sawczak, Adjunct Research Fellow at Monash University, “Obama’s Russia Policy: The Wages and Pitfalls of the Reset,” peer reviewed paper presented at the 10th Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Feb 3-4 2011, <http://cais.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Sawczak_Obama.pdf>]

As a measure of their optimism, US officials like to point – cautiously – to a discernible shift in Russian foreign policy towards a more pragmatic, cooperative approach. Whether or not the Obama administration can claim credit for this, the United States has at least shown Russia the dividends which could flow from enhanced cooperation. This is most palpably reflected in the Russian foreign policy paper leaked in May 2010, which identifies a “need to strengthen relations of mutual interdependence with the leading world powers, such as the European Union and the US,” 5 as well as, more indirectly, in Medvedev’s modernisation agenda. The fact that Russia has sought, in the tragic circumstances attending commemoration ceremonies at Katyn, rapprochement with Poland and moved to demarcate its border with Norway, in addition to partnering with the US on arms control, Iran and Afghanistan, suggests to US policy-makers that a rethink, however tenuous, is underway. Noteworthy also is the fact that Russia, gladdened by the emergence of more compliant leaders in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, has been remarkably restrained of late in its dealings closer to home, not having waged any major gas wars, threatened leaders, or incited civil war.

#### No war even if expansion occurs

David E. Hoffman 12, 10/22, contributing editor to Foreign Policy and the author of The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy, which won the 2010 Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction, "Hey, Big Spender," Foreign Policy, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/22/hey\_big\_spender?page=full

Despite tensions that flare up, the United States and Russia are no longer enemies; the chance of nuclear war or surprise attack is nearly zero. We trade in each other's equity markets. Russia has the largest audience of Facebook users in Europe, and is open to the world in a way the Soviet Union never was.

### IL: Lower Oil Prices Devastate Russia’s Economy

#### Low prices undermine Putin’s regime and collapse the Russian economy

Kramer 12 – New York Times writer and editor (ANDREW E. “Higher Oil Prices to Pay for Campaign Promises” New York Times March 16, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/business/global/vladimir-putins-big-promises-need-fueling-by-high-oil-prices.html?\_r=2?pagewanted=print Putin Needs ajones)

#### (--) Perception alone triggers the link: Even a projected decrease in oil prices kills investment, crashes economy

Scott Rose and Olga Tanas on 1/31/2013 <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-01-31/russian-economy-expanded-3-dot-4-percent-last-year-slower-than-estimated>. Bloomberg.

Russian investment unexpectedly contracted in December from a year earlier, dropping for the second time in four months. Sluggish spending by companies to boost output has become the “Achilles heel” of the economy, Deputy Economy Minister Andrei Klepach told reporters Jan. 29. Companies have held back on investment plans as they anticipated oil prices will stagnate and interest rates will remain high, according to Nordea’s Savchenko.¶ The central bank raised borrowing costs in September, becoming the largest emerging market to do so last year. First Deputy Chairman Alexei Ulyukayev said this month he doesn’t see any potential gains from reducing interest rates.¶ Government Campaign¶ The government began an open campaign this month to push the central bank to lower rates, a step the regulator is resisting because of concerns the economy is already growing near its potential. Capital flight restrained economic output even as oil prices rose, with Brent crude futures posting a record annual average of $111.68 a barrel last year, buoyed by international sanctions on Iran and the risk that the conflict in Syria would spread throughout the region.¶ “We expect more political pressure on the central bank and more loud calls from the markets and the government for monetary easing,” Julia Tsepliaeva, head of research for BNP Paribas in Moscow, said by e-mail. “We particularly attribute this slowdown to poor investment demand. Although the government plans for more aggressive stimulation of investment demand in 2013, we see some resource constraints which could affect implementation of this idea.”¶ Stuttering growth highlights the challenges facing the world’s largest energy exporter as prices for oil, its main export, are forecast to stagnate this year and Europe’s recession undercuts demand for commodities.

#### (--) LOWER OIL PRICES WILL TRIGGER A RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RECESSION.

GULF TIMES, 2013 (Apr. 19, 2013 Retrieved Apr. 21, 2013 from http://www.gulf-times.com/business /191/details/349627/foreign-investors-find-putin,-russia-promises-unfulfilled, rwg)

Mobius is still enthusiastic about Russia and said he had about $1.2bn invested in Russian equities. He said that, overall, he had made money in the country and would still like to add to his Russia exposure.¶ Many other investors are cutting theirs, some of them concerned that a lower oil price may push the country into recession following a growth downgrade in April.

#### (--) The link is linear: Every $10 decrease in oil prices decreases Russian economy by 1%

Sergei Seninsky, 8/16/2011 (economic analyst for RFE/RL's Russian Service, “Five Questions On The Russian Economy,” [http://www.rferl.org/content/five\_questions \_on\_the\_russian\_economy/24298630.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/five_questions%20_on_the_russian_economy/24298630.html))

Despite the economic slowdown in the West, the demand for Russia's main export, oil, has not only not declined, but has actually continued to grow. Oil prices, as before, have remained one of the main factors influencing the development of the Russian economy. For years, experts have used, along with other factors, a very simple formula: for every $10 the annual price of oil rises, the Russian economy grows by 1 percent. This formula also works in reverse. In general, this relationship is still valid. But some experts believe that for the Russian economy to grow by 1 percent now, the price of oil needs to rise more than $10.

#### Don’t esc – 2 reasons

**Hotspots don’t escalate – the term existential threat has been overused – yes actors can face a bunch of threats but they have not isolated a clear bar in the 2ac about what constitutes escalation – they need to isolate specific risks to specific countries to access escalation – they clearly haven’t done that – that’s drenzer**

#### military overstretch not a problem—cheap by historic standards, no incentive to balance

Michael Beckley, research fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and Internaitonal Affairs, Harvard University, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 36 n. 3, Winter 2011-12, p. 49.

#### US military power unmatched and resilient

Robert Kagan, senior fellow, foreign policy, Brookings Institution, “Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,” THE NEW REPUBLIC, 1—11—12, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism/, accessed 6-9-12

Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

Drezner 7/29 (Daniel, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution, contributing editor to Foreign Policy/Foreign Affairs, former professor at the University of Chicago and the University of Colorado, Boulder, Drezner has received fellowships from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Harvard University. BA from Williams College, MA and PhD in international relations from Stanford University, The Spectator, June 29, 2013, “While Britain stagnates, America is roaring back,” <http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8946671/while-britain-stagnates-america-is-roaring-back/>, alp)

Predicting the decline of the United States has been in vogue since the birth of American hegemony. Sputnik, Vietnam, stagflation, budget deficits, trade deficits and even the end of the Cold War all triggered predictions of the end of America. With the 2008 financial crisis, however, there seemed to be a sense that this time was different. Tomes with titles like The Post-American World and The End of Influence began to appear on bookshelves. Germany’s finance minister confidently predicted that the United States was entering its last days as a financial superpower. Serious commentators spoke about how a ‘Beijing consensus’ would supplant the ‘Washington consensus’. America looked as if it would disappear in a vortex of debt. Fast forward to this year, and a funny thing has happened to American influence — it’s unbowed. The very suggestion that America may be strong enough not to need quantitative easing sent global financial markets into spasm last week. If America was coming off life support, then the subsidies for all kinds of financial packages would end. As one financial strategist told the New York Times, ‘The Fed isn’t just the US’s central bank. It’s the world’s central bank.’ This point was not lost in Britain, where government borrowing costs surged. It’s said that when America sneezes, Britain catches a cold. But even as America gets better, Britain can remain ill. For those in Britain who are constantly told that the crisis ‘started in America’, this must all look rather strange. If the crash was an American disease, then shouldn’t Uncle Sam be worst affected? How come the US is now free of bailed-out banks, having sold them at a tidy $25 billion profit, when Britain looks like it will be saddled with zombie banks for another decade? And given that the Obama administration has spent the last few years deadlocked with a bickering Congress, how have the obstacles to growth been removed so quickly? Well, for one thing, there are some constants to American power. Its healthy demographics fuelled by immigration, geographic security, a syncretic, dynamic popular culture, and excellence in higher education and innovation are unchanged. As in previous slumps, private sector and public sector adjustments have triggered a revival in American capabilities. And this can be traced to the fact that it responded to the shock of the 2008 financial crisis more adroitly than its rivals. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the United States has actually been deleveraging from the bubble years of the past decade. Yes, millions of households were in foreclosure in America three years ago — but taking the pain then has allowed recovery now. While commentators have focused on rising government debt, US households and companies have been tackling their own. According to the OECD, the debt-to-income ratio for American households has fallen from a pre-crisis 137 per cent to 116 per cent by the end of last year. That figure is now lower than European household indebtedness. Britain is at 160 per cent. It is true that government debt has soared under Barack Obama — but that is consistent with the successful path that Scandinavian countries pursued in the early 1990s in response to their own credit bubbles. State spending propped up these economies while voters paid off their debt, and then the resurgence in private-sector demand allowed governments to balance the books. This appears to be happening now in the United States. The US federal budget deficit has declined more dramatically in the past three years than at any time in postwar history. The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal budget deficit to fall to 2.1 per cent of economic output by 2015 — an astonishing turnaround from the 10.1 per cent figure four years ago. By the same year, Britain’s deficit will still be at 6 per cent of GDP — the highest in the western world. American manufacturing is also on a roll. Contrary to perceptions, US factory output has been robust and productive — the problem was that it had been haemorrhaging jobs over the past few decades. No longer. Manufacturing might never be the jobs engine that it was a century ago — but it will not be a drag on job creation either. Durable goods manufacturing has added more than half a million jobs over the past three years. The intriguing question is whether this trend can continue. A 2011 Boston Consulting Group study argues it can, given that China is not quite the cheap workshop it once was (with rising wages and an appreciating yuan). The ‘rebalancing’ that Brits hear about is happening in the US, with up to three million jobs expected to be created in the next few years. The optimism felt by American factories is easy to explain. Energy costs have plunged. The development of hydraulic fracturing, or ‘hydro-fracking’, has sent gas prices to less than a third the level charged in Europe — quite some factor if you’re an energy-hungry manufacturer wondering where in the world to locate. Time after time, the answer to this question is: America. There has long been talk in the US about ‘reshoring’, where US companies decide to create jobs in the rustbelt states that need them most. But all sorts of companies are coming to America. Voestalpine, an Austrian steel company, declared in March that it would build a €550 million plant in Texas, having rejected 16 other sites in seven other countries. With an economic recovery comes geopolitical clout. Late last year the International Energy Agency projected that by 2020 the United States would supplant Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer. By 2030, the United States would realise its longstanding dream of energy self-sufficiency. And while the US government can hardly be credited with the fracking revolution, the Obama administration did not bar its progress — more than can be said for many European governments, some of which are so wedded to the renewables agenda that they don’t want to accept the good news. In fact, the drama on Capitol Hill has diverted attention from the recovery underway in an America which is not connected to political wrangling. As Larry Summers once put it, ‘The great mistake of the gridlock theorists is to suppose that all progress comes from legislation and that more legislation consistently represents more progress.’ Even so, the US system of government has been surprisingly nimble despite its perceived political paralysis. In the five years since the financial crisis, Congress has passed legislation that saved the US financial system, rescued the car-making sector, enacted the largest fiscal stimulus programme in the world (which contained substantial tax cuts), overhauled its financial regulation, passed ambitious health-care legislation, and then took steps to control spending. This week, the House and Senate are moving forward on comprehensive immigration reform. Compared with Britain — or anywhere in Europe — the US has been a hive of productive political activity. By contrast, the emerging Brics, who were supposed to take over the world, have seen better days. Brazil is confronting massive protests from citizens angry that so much money is being spent to prepare for the World Cup. Russia’s energy boom is tapering off; Moscow finds itself starved of foreign capital due to the caprice of President Putin. China’s economic growth during the Great Recession has far outstripped the United States; and yet its new leadership is rejecting the ‘Beijing consensus’ as quickly as it can. Indeed China may be heading for its own credit crunch: in recent weeks, its bank lending rates have surged and one bank briefly defaulted. The country’s attempts to clamp down on the misallocation of cheap credit may well have triggered its latest bout of financial turmoil. There is no denying that the relative power of the United States is less now than it was a decade ago. And yet, five years after the start of the Great Recession, US power does not appear to be on the wane. If anything, the trendlines suggest the opposite. Even Arvind Subramanian, the author of Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance, has changed his tune a bit. In a recent paper he paraphrased Mark Twain, concluding: ‘Reports of the decline in American economic power appeared to have been exaggerated.’ Plenty of dangers lie ahead. The United States could get trapped into another draining war in the Middle East. Partisan bickering in Washington could block any structural budget reforms and cripple America’s long-term finances. A premature end to quantitative easing, or another eurozone crisis, could induce another setback. But the United States has a remarkable ability to right its own ship. That ability, in and of itself, is one of the sources of its enduring power.